Affirmatively Ambiguous: Reforming the Fraud Federal Sentencing Guideline Rules in “Affirmative Action” Government Contracts by Sabo, Michael
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2019
Affirmatively Ambiguous: Reforming the Fraud
Federal Sentencing Guideline Rules in “Affirmative
Action” Government Contracts
Michael Sabo
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sabo, Michael, "Affirmatively Ambiguous: Reforming the Fraud Federal Sentencing Guideline Rules in “Affirmative Action”
Government Contracts" (2019). Law School Student Scholarship. 962.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/962
I. Introduction 
 
In fiscal year 2017, the federal government contracted with nearly 3.5 million different 
individuals and awarded over 350 billion dollars in contracts.1  Specifically, the government 
reserves and allocates substantial sums of contract dollars for small businesses run by historically 
disadvantaged individuals such as minorities and women.2  Unfortunately, individuals (referred to 
as “white collar criminals”3) steal hundreds of millions of dollars annually from various 
government programs by means of fraud, embezzlement or improper disbursement.4 Sentencing 
white collar criminals implicates challenging issues including how to punish behavior not 
immediately recognizable as criminal because fraud crimes often implicate amorphous victims.5 
Without reforming the federal United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (the “Guidelines”) Comment 
Application Notes (“the Notes”), the small business procurement market of individual minority 
and women business owners will continue to suffer harm.6   
The circuit courts of appeals use two major approaches to calculate loss when criminals 
steal money intended for minority or women businesses.7  As a result, a circuit split exists where 
several circuit courts apply the general loss rule, while others apply the government benefits 
                                                 
1 USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov (LAST VISITED SEPT. 14, 2017).  
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2016); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–.15 (2014). 
3 Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White Collar Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 34 (2015) 
(defining “white collar criminals” as unique because they share several distinct characteristics; they are typically 
white, older, and better educated with no prior criminal history). 
4 See Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a) Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS (2017), http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/; see also 
Michelle McVicker, The Real Cost of DBE Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 1, 8 (2016) (stating the largest DBE fraud 
in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million dollars over 15 years). 
5 Id. at 34 (defining “amorphous victims” as “the market” or a faceless organization that does not suffer in the same 
way one who is robbed or assaulted would); see Christopher C. Reese, Note, A New Sentencing Blueprint: The Third 
Circuit Allows Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud Convictions to Be Offset by Construction Contract 
Performance in United States v. Nagle, 61 VILL. L. REV. 681–88 (2016). 
6 Henning, supra, at 34 (noting that white collar crime and procurement fraud implicates unseen harm). 
7 See e.g., United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 602 (5th Cir 2016) (applying the general loss rule); United States v. 
Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying the special government benefits rule). 
special loss rule.8  The decision as to whether to apply the general rule or the government benefits 
rule matters because an individual can defraud the government in one circuit, but serve 
considerably more or less time in a different circuit for committing the same offense.9  For 
example, under the general loss rule, small business owner A that defrauds the government of one 
million dollars who uses some of the funds for legitimate purposes will have the legitimate services 
subtracted from the one million dollars awarded. Importantly, owner A will see a reduction in 
prison time because A performed on the contract to some extent. In contrast, if B defrauds the 
government of one million dollars deemed to be “government benefits,” B will owe the entire one 
million dollars in restitution and be sentenced as such regardless of any legitimate services 
provided. Therefore, dramatic discrepancies in federal sentencing breed unfairness, injustice, and 
reinforce the need for uniform sentencing policy in fraud cases involving “affirmative action” 
programs. 
In this comment, I will argue that the United States Sentencing Commission (“The 
Commission”) should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to 
clarify that an individual who steals from “affirmative action” programs will be liable for every 
dollar received from the government without any reduction for legitimate services rendered.10 In 
the alternative, to avoid varying interpretations concerning whether the Small Business 
Administration 8(a) (SBA) and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) programs are 
“government benefits,”11 the Commission should add the following text to the enumerated list of 
examples included in the 3(F)(ii) special rules: government benefits include “Small Business 
Administration and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise grants or any type of federal program 
                                                 
8 See id. 
9 See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii); see also id. n.3(A). 
10 See id. §2B1.1(b)(1). 
11 See id. 
payments with the aim of giving exclusive opportunities to women businesses, minority 
businesses, or businesses run by any class of disadvantaged persons.”  Lastly, until the 
Commission revises the Notes, the Supreme Court should hold that SBA 8(a) contracts and DBE 
grants should be considered “government benefits” within the meaning of 3(F) for federal 
sentencing purposes.   
First, this comment will introduce the Commission, the Guideline comments language, and 
provide a detailed explanation of the relevant rules provisions.  Second, this comment will explore 
the history of the Commission, the specific comment rules at issue, and the purpose of SBA 8(a) 
and DBE programs.  Third, this comment will explain the various circuit courts of appeals 
decisions regarding the Note application.  Fourth, this comment will evaluate both sides of the 
circuit split and argue that affirmative action procurement programs should be considered 
“government benefits.” Finally, this comment will argue that the Commission should amend 
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to explicitly state that “affirmative action” government contracts programs 
belong under the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii).  
 
II. Background 
 
 
A. Congress Creates the Sentencing Commission & Guidelines  
 
The Commission, created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 198412 as part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,13 is an independent agency within the judicial branch 
tasked with instituting “sentencing policies and practices14 for the federal criminal justice system 
                                                 
12 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2008). 
13 Pub. L. No 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006) (outlining duties of the Commission). 
that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines,15 and prescribing the 
appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.”16  The Commission includes 
seven voting members (typically a combination of federal judges, federal prosecutors, and legal 
scholars) and two ex officio non-voting members (including representatives from the parole 
commission and the Attorney General).17  Importantly, Congress espoused three overarching 
principles in creating the Commission: (1) combat crime honestly through an effective, fair system, 
(2) introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing discrepancies in sentences 
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders, and (3) sentence proportionally in a 
way that accounts for severity of offenses and repeat offenders.18  The circuit split on whether to 
apply the general loss rule or the government benefits rule should be resolved to realign the 
sentencing rules with Congress’s three guiding principles.  
 
B. Calculating the Proper Guidelines Sentence under United States v. Booker 
After an individual is convicted of a federal crime, federal courts apply the Guidelines to 
determine the appropriate sentence and any potential restitution to be paid by the criminal.19  
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines covers economic crimes including larceny, embezzlement, fraud, 
forgery, and counterfeiting offenses.20 The Guidelines provide a sentencing structure for federal 
courts while streamlining the mechanics of federal sentencing.21 In United States v. Booker, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the Guidelines requirements are not mandatory, and 
appellate courts must review federal sentences calculated under the Guidelines for 
                                                 
15 Id. § 994(a).  
16 USSG §2B1.1(b)(1) ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).  
17 Id. subpt. 1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016); see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008). 
18 USSG §2B1.1(b)(1) ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, p.s.; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2008). 
19 USSG § 2B1.1 (2018); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
20 USSG § 2B1.1 (2018) 
21 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264; see USSG § 2B1.1 (2018). 
unreasonableness.22  The process by which federal courts apply the Guidelines varies slightly 
among the circuit courts of appeals;23 however, the Third Circuit’s three-step process serves as an 
instructive example of how courts calculate an appropriate federal sentence in compliance with 
Booker.24  In the Third Circuit, a district court calculates an appropriate sentence under Booker by 
identifying the correct sentencing range under the Guidelines, considering departure motions from 
the base offense level, and applying any variances that may justify an increase or decrease in an 
individual’ sentence.25  
  In the Third Circuit, the three-step sentencing process begins with the District Court 
properly calculating the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.26 As mentioned above, 
the Guidelines range functions as the starting point or the “Base Offense Level” for a court to begin 
the sentencing calculation.27  Relevant to the analysis, “[t]he amount of loss that a defendant is 
found to have caused largely drives the determination of [the] recommended sentencing range 
under the Guidelines.”28 Second, after the court establishes the base offense level, the District 
                                                 
22 Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (stating that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence”). 
23 See e.g., United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 374–77 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the District Court may use a 
less rigid federal sentencing procedure to bypass a “minefield of tricky determinations” so long as the court arrives 
at the correct Guidelines sentencing range and explicitly weighs the required §3553(a) factors); United States v. 
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 454–458 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that the appropriate standard for calculating federal sentences 
under the Guidelines post-Booker involves a four-step analysis where the District Court must (1) properly calculate 
the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines; (2) determine whether a sentence within that range and within 
the statutory limitations serves the factors set forth in §3553(a), and, if not, select a sentence that does serve those 
factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the particular 
sentence, especially explaining why a sentence outside of the Guidelines range better serves the relevant sentencing 
purposes set forth in §3553(a)). 
24 United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d. Cir. 2015); see United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
25 Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308. 
26 See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179 (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308). 
27 See id. 
28 Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar 
Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1003 (2010) (discussing the importance of loss calculation in determining the 
appropriate Guidelines range in white collar crime sentencing). 
Court must consider departure motions.29 A departure motion allows the court to consider 
“depart[ing] from the applicable guidelines range” when “there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance . . .”30  Guideline departures, which must be carefully justified and explained by the 
court, should only apply in “atypical case[s]” and the Guidelines enumerate reasons for adjusting 
sentences upward or downward.31  Pertinent to fraud in the government contract context, a court 
may find upward variations for harm to unaccounted for property or crimes that cause a 
“significant disruption of a governmental function.”32  In the third and final step of the sentencing 
analysis, the District Court must consider applying variances pursuant to the statutory factors 
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).33 Section 3553(a) obliges courts to impose sentences 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”34 Federal courts may consider (among other things) 
the following factors in imposing a sentence: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” 
(2) the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect of the law, and to provide 
                                                 
29 See USSG § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A) (prescribing departure process). 
30 See id.; see also Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing step two of sentencing calculation process where departure 
motions must be considered).  
31 See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and Variances 19 (2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting USSG n.55, ch.1, pt. A(4)(b)) (describing application of departures and 
noting they should “only apply in the ‘atypical’ case lying outside the ‘heartland’ of conduct covered by the 
guidelines”); see also id. at 4–40 (detailing overview of departures authorized by the Guidelines); see also Fumo, 
655 F.3d at 308.  
32 See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and Variances at 19–21 
(quoting United States v. Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2004)). Under the Guidelines, “[i]f the offense caused 
property damage or loss not taken into account within the [G]uidelines, the court may increase the sentence above 
the authorized guideline range” in an amount “depend[ent] on the extent to which the harm was intended or 
knowingly risked and on the extent to which the harm to property is more serious than other harm caused or risked 
by the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.”; USSG § 5K2.7. (stating “[i]f the defendant’s conduct resulted 
in a significant disruption of a governmental function, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized 
[G]uideline range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function 
affected”).  
33 See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (explaining third step of sentencing process where “court [must] consider[] the 
recommended Guidelines range together with statutory factors . . . and determine[] the appropriate sentence . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted); see also id. at 317 (explaining the difference between departures and variances where 
departures are deviations from the Guidelines range based on “reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves,” 
while variances are deviations “based on an exercise of the court’s discretion under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (instructing courts on appropriate factors to consider for imposing a sentence). 
just punishment for the offense,” and (3) the need for deterrence.35  Overall, federal courts calculate 
an appropriate sentence for financial crimes contained in section 2B1.1 by using the range 
calculated in step one, adding or subtracting (via aggravating or mitigating factors) departures in 
step two, and increasing or decreasing the range to reflect any applicable variances.36 
 
Section 2B1.1 Loss Rules Under the Guidelines That Apply to “Affirmative Action” Contract 
Fraud. 
 
 
As illustrated above, Guidelines section 2B1.1 prescribes offense level calculations for 
economic crimes including fraud and deceit.37  Within section 2B1.1, subsection (A) provides the 
base offense level and subsection (B) provides a detailed list of modifications for offense-specific 
characteristics that can increase or decrease an offender’s base sentencing level based on various 
aggravating and mitigating factors.38  In calculating loss, the Guidelines provide for baseline loss 
and sentencing totals that are adjusted upward for loss where the offense level increases, the loss 
increases in a directly proportional manner.39 The two most pertinent rules within section 2B1.1 
for calculating sentencing totals for fraud in the “affirmative action” contract context include the 
general loss rule and the special loss rules.40 
  
a. The General Loss Rule in 3(A) & the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule in 
3(F)(ii) 
 
In cases involving government contract fraud, the general loss rule provides the starting 
point for the sentencing analysis.41  The general loss rule applies to loss under subsection (b)(1) 
                                                 
35 Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (detailing several relevant factors courts should consider in determining whether a variance 
may be applicable in the  DBE/8(a) “affirmative action” contract fraud context). 
36 See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing a court’s responsibility at third step of the sentencing analysis). 
37 United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d. Cir. 2015). 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016); see id. cmt. n.3(F). 
41 Id. n.3(A). 
and states that “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.”42  The Notes define “actual loss” 
as “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”43  Pecuniary harm 
“means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.”44  Intended loss 
is defined as the pecuniary harm that offender sought to inflict. 45  In invoking the general loss rule 
instead of the government benefits special rule, federal courts cite section 2B1.1 Note 3(A)(v)(II) 
as the appropriate provision governing procurement fraud cases for fraud related to a defense 
contract award.46  To that end, some judges would apply 3(A)(v)(II) regardless of the nature, 
circumstances or purpose surrounding the defense contract award.47 
The government benefits rule, a special rule under Note 3(F)(ii) that supplants the general 
loss rule, applies in cases involving “government benefits” including fraud of grants, loans, and 
entitlement program payments.48  In government benefits fraud cases, the Guidelines require that 
“loss shall be considered to be not less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended 
recipients or diverted from intended uses.”49  In short, if a court concludes that an offender’s fraud 
included “government benefits,” the loss for sentencing purposes will be the entire total of the 
grant or contract awarded without any mitigation for legitimate services rendered.50  As shown 
above, the decision as to whether to apply the general rule or the government benefits rule 
implicates serious consequences for an individual’s aggregate sentence.51  
 
b. Current Issues in Interpreting & Applying the Guideline Notes 
 
                                                 
42 Id. n.3(A). 
43 Id. n.3(A)(i). 
44 Id. n.3(A)(iii). 
45 Id. n.3(A)(ii). 
46 United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 183 (3d. Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring) 
47 Id. 
48 USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  
51 See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii); see also id. n.3(A); see infra Part I. 
Currently, varying interpretations as to whether an “affirmative action” government 
contract program constitutes a “government benefit” and textual issues within the Guideline 
comments continue to frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by creating the Commission.  
As stated by Congress, the Commission’s goals and purpose is to “provide certainty and fairness” 
in sentencing, “[avoid] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct,” maintain flexibility in sentencing 
sufficient to “permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating and aggravating 
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices,” and “reflect, 
to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal 
justice process[.]”52 Presently, the conflict between Note 3(E)(i) and Note 3(F)(ii) and the current 
comment’s language providing that 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subsection (A)” creates 
problems with consistent statutory interpretation.53  Moreover, in cases involving SBA 8(a) 
defense contract procurement fraud,54 courts may properly conclude that 3(A)(v)(II) applies in 
cases of “procurement fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”55  If 3(A)(v)(II) 
applies, like 3(E)(ii), the general loss rule must be used for calculating sentence severity and 
requires that the amount lost be mitigated so that loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss, 
not the full amount awarded under the contract.56 
 
c. The “Affirmative Action” Government Programs at Issue: Well-Intentioned Programs 
Exploited.  
 
a. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Joint Venture Program  
 
                                                 
52 28 U.S.C. § 991(2008); see USSG ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
53 See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016). 
54 See id. 
55 USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
56 See USSG § 2B1.1; Harris, 821 F.3d at 608. 
The SBA, created under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958,57 exists to “ensure 
small businesses [receive] a ‘fair proportion’ of government contracts.”58 Many fraud cases 
involve the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, a federal program which allows an 8(a) firm that lacks the 
capability to perform a contract on its own to enter into a joint venture agreement to perform the 
contract.59  Specifically, the Section 8(a) Joint Venture Program authorizes the SBA to coordinate 
fulfillment of federal procurement contracts through qualifying small businesses.60 Under the 8(a) 
Joint Venture Program, participants can receive up to 4 million dollars for goods and services and 
up to 6.5 million for manufacturing ventures.61  To qualify for 8(a) contracts, a small business 
“must be owned and controlled by one or more ‘socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals.’”62  As such, the 8(a) program provides procurement opportunities by acting as an 
“affirmative action” contracting program.63  SBA attempts to limit fraudulent joint venture 
arrangements by warning that joint venture approval may be denied where an 8(a) firm brings its 
8(a) status and substantively little else to the joint venture.64  SBA actively monitors for fraudulent 
joint ventures and requires that 8(a) businesses perform at least 40% of the work,65 and the Joint 
Venture Agreement must specify how the division of labor requirements will be met.66  
                                                 
57 Pub.L. No 85-699, Title I, § 102, 72 Stat. 689 (1958). 
58 About the SBA: The Founding of the SBA, (2017), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history; see 15 
U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (declaration of SBA policy); see also 15 U.S.C. § 661 (stating that the overall purpose and policy 
of Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is to “improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the small-
business segment thereof in particular by establishing a program to stimulate and supplement the flow of private equity 
capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound financing of their business 
operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply”). 
59 See 13 C.F.R §124.513 (2016). 
60 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A–B) (2016).  
61 About the SBA: Benefits of the Program, (2017), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history.  
62 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2016); id. § 637 (a)(1)(C).  
63 See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2016).  
64 13 C.F.R § 124.513(a)(2). 
65 Id. § 124.513(d) (stating that the 40% labor division requirement became effective in March 2011 where prior to 
that date, SBA regulations required that an 8(a) firm complete a “significant portion” of the contract work, but no 
percentage was explicitly specified).  
66 Id. § 124.513(c)(7). 
Unfortunately, many “8(a) businesses” have stolen millions of dollars by misrepresenting its 8(a) 
status, or by joining with a non-8(a) business as a matter of pretense only to have the non-8(a) 
business complete most of the contract work and reap most of the award dollars.67 
b. The Department of Transportation’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise 
Program  
 
The DOT, which requires (under authority from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) 
that any state that receives federal transportation funds must set goals for participation in 
transportation construction projects by disadvantaged68 business enterprises, remains susceptible 
to fraud and abuse.69 Congress created the DBE program for recipients of federal transportation 
funds.70 The DOT spends approximately fifty billion dollars annually on construction projects and 
the government requires that roughly ten percent of its construction budget or five billion dollars 
be allocated to qualifying DBEs.71 A DBE is a for-profit small business that “is at least 51% owned 
by an individual or individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged72 and whose 
management and daily operations are controlled by one or more of the disadvantaged individuals 
who own it.73  Additionally, states must announce DBE participation goals and certify a business 
as a DBE prior to contract bidding.74 To be considered a certified DBE, the DBE must “perform 
                                                 
67 See Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a) Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS (2017), http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/.  
68 49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014) (defining “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals” to include African-
Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Hispanic Americans, and women among other 
classifications).  
69 Id. § 26.21 (2014); see generally id. § 26(A–C). 
70 Id. § 26.1–26.109 (2016); see also 23 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (stating that no individual receiving federal assistance 
may be discriminated against on the basis of gender under agency authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); see also George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Programs, 17 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 423 (2007) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.3); see also George R. La Noue, Western States’ 
Light: Restructuring the Federal Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22 GEO. MASON. U. 
C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (citing 49 § U.S.C. 31105(f) (2012)). 
71 See McVicker, supra, at 4. 
72 See Adarand, 528 U.S. at 261 (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting that minority and women subcontractors are 
frequently subject to less traditional or obvious disadvantages “than direct, intentional racial prejudice”). 
73 49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014). 
74 Id. § 26.81. 
[] a commercially useful function on [the] contract.75  Therefore, like SBA 8(a) requirements, a 
DBE whose “role is limited to that of an extra participant in a transaction, contract, or project 
through which funds are passed in order to obtain the appearance of DBE participation” does not 
qualify for DBE participation.76  Regrettably, as with the SBA 8(a) program, the DOT’s DBE 
program remains susceptible to fraud and abuse because individuals seeking lucrative government 
contracts can creatively set up businesses and joint ventures that use one party’s DBE status as a 
cover to receive federal dollars.77  
 
III. Current Circuit Court of Appeals Interpretation & Application of the Rules 
 
 
In the absence of Supreme Court or Commission guidance on whether the general loss rule 
or the government benefits rule applies to “affirmative action” contract fraud, the circuit courts of 
appeals continue to reach contradictory conclusions endangering Congress’s goals of crafting the 
Guidelines to create uniformity and fairness in federal sentencing nationwide. Indeed, two circuits 
concluded that the general loss rule applies.78  Conversely, three circuits held that the government 
benefits rule applies and voids any mitigation provisions in the general rule.79  Finally, the Third 
Circuit in United States v. Nagle assumed that SBA and DBE programs should be considered 
“government benefits”; however, the Third Circuit declined to resolve the issue definitively 
                                                 
75 Id. § 26.55(c)  
76 Id. § (c)(2). 
77 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-89-26, HIGHWAY CONTRACTING: ASSESSING FRAUD AND 
ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM, 
https://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-89-26 (finding that contractors paid over 1 million dollars to settle fraud 
claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste) (1989); see also 
McVicker, supra, at 8–9 (stating the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 
136 million dollars over 15 years and 18.7 million dollar fraud perpetrated by steel company using phone invoices). 
78 Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015). 
79 Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006); Bros. Constr. Co., 219 
F.3d 300, 321 (4th Cir. 2000). 
because the court concluded that comment 3(E)(i) displaces 3(F)(ii) as currently written.80  Despite 
the Third Circuit’s court’s refusal to conclude whether comment rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to 
DBE programs, the Court applied 3(E)(ii) to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.81  In sum, the Third 
Circuit reached a legally sound conclusion given the Notes’ current statutory construction. 
However, the case serves as a model for why the Notes require urgent reform given the billions of 
taxpayer dollars that remain vulnerable.  
 
Circuits That Apply the General Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action” Program Fraud Cases 
 
 
In United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of whether the general loss 
rule or the government benefit rule applies in a fraud case involving the SBA’s 8(a) Joint Venture 
Program.82  Harris, a retired Army Colonel who worked for a non-8(a) firm that performed large-
scale defense projects, created a joint venture with an 8(a) SBA approved business (Tropical and 
Luster).83  Overall, the joint venture received three 8(a) contracts: first for $69,994, second for 
$947,722 and third for $492,169 totaling $1,317,593.51.84  Harris defrauded the federal 
government by joining with Tropical and Luster (approved 8(a) firms) to receive 8(a) status, but 
Harris did not give either 8(a) qualified company a significant role in the planning or executing 
process.85  In short, Harris flouted SBA 8(a) regulations (mentioned above) by paying Tropical 
and Luster 51% of the project profits to “make everything look legitimate.”86  The District Court 
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found Harris guilty on all counts and he challenged the loss calculation that led to a two-level 
adjustment for his role in the crime, a two-level adjustment for abusing a position of trust, and a 
sixteen-level increase under section 2B1.1(a)(1).87  On appeal, Harris argued that the government 
did not show harm to the procuring agencies because the Joint Venture performed all contracted 
for services.88  Harris also argued that the loss amount totaled zero because neither the 8(a) 
companies, nor the government suffered pecuniary harm.89  Finally, Harris argued that in the 
alternative, the court “can look to the gain from the scheme, which is also zero.”90  In reply, the 
government argued on appeal that contracts awarded under the 8(a) program are “government 
benefits” and subject to the 3(F) special rule where the court should determine loss by adding the 
face value of the contracts with no loss mitigation.91 
The Fifth Circuit held that the 8(a) program did not constitute “government benefits” under 
section 2B1.1 Note 3(F)(ii); therefore, defense contract loss should be calculated under the general 
rule.92  The court determined that “the general rule . . . [applies] [i]n the case of a procurement 
fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”93 The court further stated that 8(a) 
procurement contracts do not constitute “government benefits” because 3(F) only applies to grants, 
loans, and entitlement program payments.94  To that end, although the enumerated list in 3(F) is 
not necessarily exhaustive, the doctrine of noscitur a sociss canon95 requires that an enumerated 
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list can only be expanded to entities sharing the common features of the enumerated examples.96  
Moreover, the court reasoned that “while a government contract awarded under an affirmative 
action program may be, in some sense, a ‘benefit,’ it does share any common features [of the 
enumerated list]” and it is a bargained for exchange, not a unilateral transfer.97  Likewise, the court 
was not persuaded by its sister circuits that concluded that the government benefits rule applies 
because “the mere fact that a government contract furthers some public policy objective apart from 
the government’s procurement needs is not enough to transform the contract into a ‘government 
benefit’ akin to a grant or an entitlement payment program.”98  The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
the loss amount should not be the total contract price (as under 3(F)), but rather the “contract price 
less the fair market value of services rendered by the Joint Venture to the procuring agencies.”99  
The court reasoned that calculating total loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1), 3(E)(i) requires that 
“[l]oss shall be reduced by . . . the fair market value of the . . . services rendered.” 100 Note 3(E)(i) 
applies broadly to all sections of section 2B1.1(b) including loss under the general rule.101  The 
Fifth Circuit joined the Third and Ninth Circuits in concluding that if the Commission wanted 
3(F)(ii) to apply to the general rule in 3(A), it would not have included rule 3(F)(v) requiring “loss 
to be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered to the defendant.”102 
In United States. v. Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that “the sentencing court [should] not 
use the entire amount of government contract dollars awarded to defendant in calculating loss for 
fraud cases involving the SBA 8(a) program or the state-administered DBE contracts.”103  Martin 
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owned a construction company (“MarCon”) that focused on installing steel guardrails and concrete 
barriers for public highways.104  Over a seven-year period (1999-2006), MarCon “received nearly 
$20 million from 85 contracts awarded through the DBE program, and successfully performed 
each contract.”105  MarCon also received three contracts worth nearly 3 million dollars from SBA 
programs.106  The federal government caught Martin diverting profits made from the SBA and 
DBE programs to accounts hidden from the IRS.107  By not reporting these profits, Martin avoided 
paying over $100,000 in income taxes.108  At sentencing, Martin asserted that proper loss to the 
government was zero given that MarCon fully performed on all contracts awarded to it.109  Yet, 
the District Court found pecuniary harm and applied the “procurement fraud rule” (the same rule 
as the Fifth Circuit applied) found in Note 3(A)(v)(II) of section 2B1.1.110  In reply, the government 
argued that the court should apply 3(F)(ii) and conclude that the total loss amount equaled the total 
value of the contracts totaling $22 million.111  The District Court held that “the government benefits 
rule” applied; however, the court concluded that loss under the rule should be $3 million, the total 
profits earned by Martin.112 
First, the Ninth Circuit adopted Martin’s argument on appeal and held that the general rule 
applies to affirmative action contracts under the 3(A)(v)(II) “procurement fraud rule.”113  As such, 
the court stated that 3(E)(i) applied so that “[l]oss shall be reduced” by “the fair market value of . 
. . the services rendered . . . by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was detected.”114  
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Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the “procurement fraud rule” in 
3(A)(v)(II) is the closest fit for this case because the rule’s “placement within application note 
3(A), rather than in note 3(F) with the special rules, indicates that procurement fraud cases fall 
under the general rule for calculating actual and intended loss.”115  Second, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the “government benefits rule” did not apply because the 3(F) special rules apply 
“[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A).”116 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applied because although “an 
‘exclusive opportunity’ might be a benefit in some sense, . . . the Guidelines’ focus on pecuniary 
harm” suggest that comment 3(F)(ii) deals exclusively with unilateral government assistance such 
as food stamps, not fee-for-service business deals.117  Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
general rule applied because statutory interpretation requires that when interpreting examples in 
an enumerated list, all terms must include similar characteristics to the enumerated list.118  The 
court further reasoned that if applying basic rules of statutory interpretation fails to illuminate the 
correct result, the rule of lenity compels an interpretation in favor of the defendant.119  The rule of 
lenity in statutory interpretation dictates that where Congress’s intent remains ambiguous and 
reasonable minds may defer as to its intent, courts should adopt the less harsh interpretation of the 
Guidelines punishment.120 Despite concluding that the 3(A) general loss rules applied, the court 
noted that “DBE and SBA programs are designed to benefit disadvantaged businesses.”121 The 
court stated “[i]t is conceivable that the government paid a premium contract price”; however, any 
                                                 
115 United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). 
116 Martin, 796 F.3d at 1108 (citing USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii)(v)). 
117 Id. at 1109.  
118 Id. (citing Hamilton v. Madigan, 961 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 1992)).  
119 See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). 
120 Rule of Lenity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
121 Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111. 
difference between what the government paid versus the normal contract price is the actual loss.122  
Finally, the court conceded that there may be non-pecuniary losses to the government in that 
Martin’s fraud may have harmed the integrity of the programs and cheated law abiding DBEs out 
of potential contracts.123  Nevertheless, the court concluded that non-pecuniary loss may be 
properly assessed by the District Court in applying the Guidelines under the correct rule.124 
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applied the general loss rule to “affirmative 
action” contract procurement fraud finding that either Note 3(E)(i) supersedes 3(F) in the defense 
contract fraud context or the “[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A)” 
language precluded the application of the government benefits special rule in 3(F)(ii).125 Both 
circuits concluded that 3(F)(ii) did not apply by relying on general principals of statutory 
interpretation,126 despite conceding that the government “likely” paid a premium for the 
“affirmative action” contracts and tacitly acknowledging that such contracts remain unique in the 
federal contracting scheme.127 
 
Circuits That Apply the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action” Program 
Fraud Cases 
 
 
In United States v. Brothers Construction Co., the Fourth Circuit held that the government 
benefits special rule applies in fraud case involving a state-administered DBE program.128  In 1994, 
the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (“WVDOH”) solicited 
bids for a $5 million DBE project.129 Two business partners (Tri-State) contracted with Brothers 
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Construction (a certified DBE) to work on a local highway project. After winning the DBE 
contract, no Brothers employees appeared on the jobsite at any point during the construction.130  
The District Court convicted Tri-State and Brothers of defrauding the government by scheming to 
divert DBE funds to a non-DBE business.131 Brothers and Tri-State argued that the sentencing 
court erred in concluding that under section 2F1.1. Note 7(d), “[i]n a case involving diversion of 
government program benefits, loss is the value of benefits diverted from intended recipients or 
uses.”132  Brothers and Tri-State further argued that loss to the government was zero133 because all 
contracts were performed by other certified DBEs.134 Thus, defendants argued that the project 
received required DBE performance and the WVDOH received what it bargained for.135 In 
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit applied the now nonexistent section 2F1.1. Note 7(d) government 
benefits rule to the DBE fraud without explanation.136 
In United States v. Leahy, the Seventh Circuit held that a city ordinance meant to direct 
contracts to minority (MBEs) and women-owned businesses (WBEs) constituted an “affirmative 
action” program under Note 8(d) (the current 3(F)), which required sentencing to be based on the 
total contract dollars awarded with no mitigation for services rendered.137  The ordinance, like the 
DBE requirements, required that an MBE or minority group must own 51% of the company and 
one or more minority members must be involved in day-to-day management.138 After Chicago 
passed the ordinance, James Duff set up a business with his mother (Green Duff) to qualify for 
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WBE status.139  An investigation revealed that Green Duff technically owned all the company 
stock, but had no real involvement with the business’s management.140  During the fraud scheme, 
defendants received over $100 million dollars in state and federal grants.141  Defendants argued on 
appeal that “the only loss Chicago suffered was to its regulatory interests—and intangible right 
unprotected by these statutes” at issue.142  In the alternative, the defendants argued that the Note 
governing contract procurement applied, not the government benefits rule.143  Both parties agreed 
that Guidelines 2F1.1 applied to this case.144  Yet, the District Court determined that the 
appropriate loss number should total the amount of profits145 gained, not the entire contract dollars 
awarded.146  The Seventh Circuit, citing a former city official’s testimony,147 concluded that the 
Chicago city ordinance at issue was “an affirmative action program whose fruits were reserved for 
fledgling minority and women businesses.”148   
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the government benefit rules applied 
because “the goal of Chicago’s program was fundamentally frustrated, . . . ‘it [was] a double loss, 
the loss that we computed and the real loss to all people that [did not] get this business, that [did 
not] get a chance to become [a] successful [MBE] or [WBE], because this huge amount was 
diverted.’”149 The court held that the government benefits rule applies, not the general loss rule 
because the ordinance states, “[a]n effect to direct contracts to [MBEs] and [WBEs] is required to 
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eradicate the effects of discrimination.”150  Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that “the correct amount 
under application note 8(d) is the value of the benefits diverted, which was over $100 million.”151 
In United States v. Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit held that special rule 3(F)(ii) applies 
because “CSBE and DBE programs are government benefits programs under § 2B1.1 of the 
[Guidelines].”152 A Florida grand jury indicted Maxwell on twenty-four counts of mail fraud, wire 
fraud, money laundering, and other conspiracy charges.153 At issue were six contracts funded by 
Miami Dade County (the “County”) that required compliance with the County’s Community Small 
Businesses Enterprise (“CSBE”).154 To receive a CSBE contract, the CSBE must “perform a 
commercially useful function in the completion of the contract.”155 A CSBE performs a 
“commercially useful function” when it “actually performs, manages, and supervises the work 
involved.”156  Overall, the CSBE contracts at issue involved the same requirements as the federal 
DBE contracts previously discussed.157 Once the local government approves CSBE status, the 
contractor must submit a Schedule of Participation and Monthly Utilization Reports to certify 
compliance with CSBE and DBE work requirements.158 At sentencing, Maxwell objected to the 
court’s total calculated loss at $7 million because “he was not personally awarded the contracts, 
he did not benefit from the contracts, and Fisk (his non- CSBE business partner who did all the 
work and remitted payment to the certified CSBE) made only a small profit on the contracts.”159  
On appeal, Maxwell challenged the District Court’s loss amount calculation under section 2B1.1 
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of the Guidelines.160  The government requested a total loss amount of $7,974,674 or the total 
amount of all CSBE and DBE contracts awarded.161 The District Court concluded that total loss 
was six percent of the total contracts awarded because six percent was the average profit margin 
on government electrical subcontracts.162 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the DBE and similar programs are “government benefits” 
that fall under the special rules.163  The court reasoned that “DBE and similar program[s] aimed at 
giving exclusive opportunities to women and minority businesses” makes them entitlement 
payments (one of the enumerated examples in 3(F)(ii)).164  Unlike standard construction contracts, 
“these contracts focus mainly on who is doing the work.”165  Therefore, applying 3(F)(ii), the 
“appropriate amount of loss here should have been the entire value of the CSBE and SBE contracts 
that were diverted to the unintended recipient.”166 
In United States v. Nagle, the Third Circuit held that under the standard Guideline’s 
definition of loss, defendants were liable for the total value of DBE contracts minus services and 
performance on the contracts.167  Nagle and Fink owned a non-DBE manufacturing and contracting 
business.168  Later, the business created a joint venture with a company owned by a Filipino man 
who worked on various DBE transportation projects.169  If the minority business won a DBE 
contract,170 Nagle and Fink’s business would perform all the work on the contract.171  The District 
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Court concluded that under section 2B1.1., the defendants owed the face value of the contracts 
without mitigation for work performed.172  Defendants argued that the District Court should have 
used Note 3(A) to calculate loss instead of 3(F)(ii) because “the DBE program is not a ‘government 
benefit’ and, therefore, whether not they should receive a credit for completing the 
subcontracts.”173  In the alternative, defendants claimed that “they are nonetheless entitled to credit 
under Note 3(F)(ii).174  In reply, the government asserted that the 3(F) “government benefits rule” 
applied making loss the total face value of the contracts.175  Importantly, the Third Circuit declined 
to conclude whether a DBE contract is a “government benefit” because regardless as to whether 
3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with 
credit for fair market value of services provided.176 
The Third Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies under 3(A) and 3(F) as 
currently drafted.177  If the 3(A) standard analysis applies, loss defendants must pay back includes 
the total contract value minus the fair market value of performance and raw materials provided.178  
Regarding whether the 3(F)(ii) applied, the court concluded that “the Government’s position [was] 
persuasive particularly in light of the goals of the DBE program,” who the program focuses on, 
and the emphasis on benefitting those who perform the work.179 Furthermore, the court hinted that 
the special rule could apply because “[the DBE program] assumes that performance of a contract 
allows a DBE to not only earn a profit on the deal but also to form connections with suppliers, 
labor, and others in the industry.”180 Importantly, therefore, the profit earned, is “not the only 
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benefit the DBE obtains when it receives the contract.  Accordingly, when [the parties] 
fraudulently received the [DBE contracts], the DBE program assumed that all of the contract price 
was going towards benefiting a true DBE.”181  The court concluded that if Note 3(F)(ii) applies, 
the proper loss amount is the total face value of the contracts.182   
Overall, even if 3(F)(ii) applies, 3(E)(i) overrides 3(F)(ii) based on the current comment 
text.183 Despite assuming that DBE contracts constitute “government benefits,” the Third Circuit 
held that “Note 3(E)(i) requires a credit against the full face value of the contracts [regardless as 
whether 3(A) or 3(F)] applies.]”184 Here, Note 3(E)(i) requires that “the fair market value of the 
property returned and services rendered, by . . . the defendant [] shall be credited against the 
loss.”185 In reply to 3(E)(i), the government argued that defendants are not entitled to credit because 
“as non-DBEs they did not ‘render any valuable services’” and 3(E)(i) does not apply to 3(F)(ii).186  
The court decided that 3(E)(i) applied to 3(F)(ii) for two reasons: the 3(F) special rules apply 
“[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A),” and 3(F)(v)(II) states that “loss shall include the amount paid 
for the property, services or goods transferred, rendered or misrepresented, with no credit for 
provided for the value of those items or services.”187  Notably, the court stated that “[h]ad the 
[Commission] intended to preclude crediting services render against loss for Note 3(F)(ii), it would 
have used similar language is it used in Note 3(F)(v)(II).188  In conclusion, the Third Circuit held 
that 3(E)(i) and 3(F)(ii) function together and require mitigation of the total central regardless of 
which rule applies.189  
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Judge Hardiman, concurring in United States v. Nagle, concluded that DBE fraud loss 
calculation should invoke Note 3(A), not as a government benefit under the special rule.190  Judge 
Hardiman reasoned that defendants “committed classic procurement fraud” by lying about 
“compliance with federal regulations in order to receive contracts that would have otherwise gone 
to others.”191 Furthermore, the Guidelines clearly state that the 3(A) general rule applies to fraud 
procurement and 3(A)(v)(II) dictates how 3(A) should be applied in such cases.192 Therefore, 
3(F)(ii) should apply only in fraudulent receipt of welfare payments and has “no place in a 
procurement fraud case.”193  The current circuit split involving whether rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies 
to fraud in the SBA and DBE programs continues to divide courts and frustrate Congress’s goals 
in creating the Guidelines Notes; therefore, Note 2B1.1. should be amended to provide fairness, 
continuity and notice to all defendants that defrauding the government will be met with a severe, 
predictable punishment formula. 
 
IV. Implications & Analysis 
 
Billions of dollars remain at risk. Consequently, the current circuit split implicates 
tremendous urgency in the need for federal sentencing reform in “affirmative action” government 
contracts. To address the current circuit split, the Commission should revise the Notes to ensure 
that criminals who illegally exploit government programs can be held accountable for the full 
amount of money awarded by the government regardless of the benefits or services provided. 
 
The Origin of the Problem: A Significant Change to the Guidelines Within the Last Decade Creates 
the Need for Urgent Reform to Clarify Federal Sentencing Rules and to Return to Congress’s 
Original Goals of Maintaining Uniformity and Fairness in Federal Sentencing. 
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The Supreme Court held “[t]he Guidelines Manual's commentary which interprets or 
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”194 Moreover, the “[G]uidelines 
commentary, interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is binding on [the Court] 
when we are applying that [G]uidelines because we are obligated to adhere to the Commission’s 
definition.”195 Significantly, in 2001, the Commission merged the government benefits special rule 
under section 2F1.1 into section 2B1.1.196  Based on the now nonexistent section 2F1.1, the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that SBA and DBE programs should be considered 
government benefit programs.197 Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits based their 
decisions on the 1997 and 1998 Guidelines under the former section 2F1.1, which did not require 
that loss be reduced by fair market value of services rendered akin to current rule 3(E)(i).198 The 
Commission later consolidated section 2F1.1 with section 2B1.1 in the 2001 Guidelines.199 The 
Guidelines rule change was noteworthy because the old rule 2F1.1 contained a provision similar 
to current rule 3(F)(ii) (which both courts relied on), but no rule allowing loss mitigation 
resembling 3(E)(i).200  If the Comments cannot be amended, the Supreme Court should hold that 
“affirmative action” contract programs are “government benefit” programs to reconcile decisions 
made under the old rules with the new rules.  
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Re-Evaluating United States v. Harris: The “Government Benefits” Special Rule and 
Congressional Intent Weakened 
 
If the Fifth Circuit properly interpreted the Guidelines under the noscitur a sociss doctrine, 
the court should have applied the government benefits special rule to calculate loss instead of the 
general loss rule. The noscitur a sociss doctrine, Latin for “it is known by the company that it 
keeps,” is a concept frequently employed in interpreting statutory construction.201 The Fifth Circuit 
held that the general loss rule applied and that the noscitur a sociss doctrine precluded 8(a) 
programs from being read into the enumerated examples listed in 3(F)(ii).202 Nevertheless, the 
Fifth Circuit erred in applying the general loss rule for three reasons.   
First, the Fifth Circuit’s previous application of the government benefits rule in United 
States v. Dowl on similar facts undermines its decision in United States v. Harris. In United States 
v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit cited four types of programs that it previously applied the government 
benefits rule for sentencing.203  Specifically, the court previously applied the 3(F)(ii) government 
benefits special rule in cases involving: EPA grants,204 SBA loans,205 FEMA disaster relief 
reimbursements,206 and Medicare reimbursements.207  In United States. v. Dowl,208 the Fifth Circuit 
held that the government benefits rule applied when the “[Defendant] submitted fraudulent 
applications [with the SBA’s disaster assistance loan program] to obtain government funds later 
spent inappropriately.209  The court applied the government benefits special rule in 3(F)(ii) because 
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the defendant’s scheme deprived the government of the funds’ economic value for aiding 
homeowner[s's] rebuilding efforts after Hurricane Katrina.”210 While the disaster assistance loan 
in Dowl did not reserve funds for a racial minority or women, the court noted (similar to 8(a) fraud) 
that the scheme diverted government money from the intended recipients to the defendant.211 
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Harris, like Dowd, should have applied the government benefits 
special rule because in each case, the defendant diverted funds reserved for a government specified 
recipient to an unintended recipient causing the government a double-loss.212 
Second, in United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit erred in relying on the noscitur a sociss 
doctrine when it concluded that the SBA 8(a) Joint Venture program did not share common 
features with the 3(F)(ii) enumerated list because defense contracts require a “bargained for 
exchange” and a mutual transfer of benefits.213 Indeed, the court acknowledged that an “affirmative 
action” contract program may benefit the recipient; however, the court stated that the three 
examples in 3(F)(ii) involve “a unilateral transfer,” not a “bargained for exchange.”214  The court, 
invoking the noscitur a sociss doctrine, ultimately held that the government benefits rule did not 
apply because “unlike the enumerated examples, . . . contracts awarded under the 8(a) program do 
not exist primarily to benefit the awardee, . . . such contracts first and foremost serve the 
government’s own procurement needs.”215 The reality remains just the opposite. 8(a)’s purpose 
indirectly allows the government to fulfill its procurement needs; yet, Congress expressly instituted 
8(a) and DBE programs to benefit the awardee directly by providing minorities and women a fair 
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chance in the marketplace where minorities historically retained no opportunities or in some cases 
where minorities and women continue to realize stifled business opportunity.216   
Third, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the 3(A) general rule applies to “affirmative action 
contracts” because they neither involve traditional consideration, nor the bargaining context of 
private contracts overlooks the nature of how individuals receive such contracts.217 Unlike 
traditional contracts that require consideration to be valid, a business can receive 8(a) contracts by 
simply filling out a form with basic information, the job to be completed, and certification that the 
business complied with the statute’s SBA minority work requirements.218  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit 
conceded and Congress explicitly provided that 8(a) Joint Venture contracts may “won through 
competition”219 or non-competitively on a “sole source”220 basis.221 As a result, contrary to the 
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, 8(a) and DBE contracts frequently involve a unilateral transfer of public 
taxpayer money to an applicant without traditional contract negotiations or legal consideration 
similar to EPA grants, SBA loans, FEMA disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare 
reimbursement.  Moreover, in contrast with United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit in United 
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States v. Lopez previously held that defrauding a federal contract program [the Javits-Wagner-
O’Day Act or “JWOD”] designed to employ blind and disabled individuals constituted a loss under 
the government benefits rule.222  In Lopez, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government benefits 
rule applied when Lopez directed only nine percent of the contract award to the intended disabled 
or blind recipients.223 Although, Lopez did not involve racial based affirmative action goals, the 
court held that the government benefits rule nevertheless applied because “[t]he focus in the JWOD 
program is on providing employment opportunities for the severely disabled, not on the specific 
product or service provided.”224  The government benefits special rule in the 3(F)(ii) list states that 
the rule applies to “(e.g., grants, loans, entitlement program payments).”225 As stated above and 
contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 8(a) and DBE programs could be reconciled with the 
noscitur a sociss doctrine and be identified as unilateral grants or “program payments” due to the 
unilateral nature of procurement procedures, the lack of consideration exchanged between parties, 
and the bargaining dynamics involved. Therefore, if a federal contract program to specifically 
benefit the disabled constitutes a “government benefit,” the 8(a) program should have been deemed 
such as well.  In conclusion, given the holdings in Lopez and Dowl, and Congress’s explicit intent 
in creating the SBA and DBE programs, the government benefits special rule enumerated example 
list should be construed broadly to include SBA 8(a) and DBE programs. 
 
Applying the Government Benefits Special Loss Rules for Defrauding “Affirmative Action” 
Government Contracts Will Promote Fairness, Re-Invigorate Congress’s Public Policy Goals, 
Deter Potential White Collar Criminals, and Send a Strong Message to the Public That Stealing 
from the Government and Disadvantaged Businesses Will Not Be Condoned. 
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In the interests of public policy and fairness, the Commission should amend the Notes to 
ensure that defrauding an “affirmative action” government programs results in a loss equal to the 
entire contract award without mitigation.  Specifically, the public policy purposes for 3(F)(ii), to 
ensure maximum punishment for stealing from the government and taxpayers, should not be 
circumvented or frustrated by Note 3(E)(i) or Note 3(F)(v)(II) as currently written.  To remedy the 
situation, the Commission should revise the sentencing rules to ensure that criminals who illegally 
exploit government programs can be held accountable for the full amount of money awarded by 
the government regardless of any benefits or services provided.  Moreover, “affirmative action” 
contract programs should be considered “government benefits” because Congress created such 
programs to espouse a government policy favoring socially disadvantaged individuals in the 
marketplace.226 Finally, Congress explicitly created the Commission to “combat crime honestly 
through an effective, fair system.”227 To realize Congress’s goals, fairness demands that anyone 
who defrauds a government “affirmative action” program should be sentenced under 3(F)(ii) to 
guarantee that loss will be the entire contract total awarded just as if the criminal defrauded 
Medicare, the EPA, or welfare benefits. 
“Affirmative action” contract programs should also be considered “government benefits” 
to strengthen and reassert deterrence interests in federal sentencing.  The theory of deterrence in 
criminal law relies on the assumption that fear of punishment will influence potential criminals to 
                                                 
226 See Adarand, 528 U.S. at 217 ("Congress has adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned 
and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged"); see 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 (stating objectives of DBE 
Program are among other things “to ensure nondiscrimination in the award and administration of DOT-assisted 
contracts,” to create a level playing field for DBEs, and to “assist the development of firms that can competes 
successfully in the marketplace outside the DBE program”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (stating among other 
things that it is the policy of Congress to aid, counsel, and assist small businesses in their competitive enterprises and 
assist such businesses to compete in international markets); 13 C.F.R. 124.1 (2018) (stating the “purpose of the SBA 
8(a) [Business Development] program is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the in 
the American economy through business development”); see also McVickers, supra note 43, at 7 (noting that 
taxpayers are impacted when public funds are allocated contrary to congressional intent). 
227 USSG ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
not break the law.228 To increase deterrence, the Commission should amend the Guidelines’ text 
for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule 
under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating 
that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”229 Amending the Notes in this manner 
will standardize and deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs 
regardless as to whether a business fully performs a contract. The Notes should be reformed 
because a federal court’s ability to mitigate loss under 3(F)(v)(II) or 3(E)(i) undermines the 
deterrence role and the recognition of non-pecuniary loss envisioned by the drafters of 3(F)(ii). To 
that end, Congress created the Commission to “introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by 
narrowing discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar 
offenders.”230 Uniformity, where courts treat all individuals similarly and fair notice, where all 
individuals know that they will receive a harsher penalty for a given offense, increases 
deterrence.231 Consequently, the existing circuit split on the issue of “affirmative action” 
government programs undermines the benefits of deterrence provided by uniform sentencing and 
the goals set forth by Congress in creating the Commission and the Guidelines.232 In the context 
of economic crimes, the symbolism of higher prison terms “is important [in deterring white collar 
crime or contract procurement fraud] because the strongest possible message should be sent to 
those who would engage in similar conduct that they will be caught and punished to the full extent 
of the law.”233   
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The Notes should also be amended to address specific deterrence and general deterrence to 
maximize the deterrent effect on individuals that may consider stealing from the SBA and DBE 
programs.234 Critically, amending the Notes will deter federal courts from “succumbing to the 
impulse to see [white collar defendants] in the warm light of a contrite individual who engaged in 
aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend again.”235  In the alternative, even if higher sentences 
do not reduce fraud crime directly, greater prison time may “deter judges from going to one 
extreme or the other” . . . because higher sentencing “requires consideration of the impact on 
society and not solely the particular offender.”236 Furthermore, higher standardized punishments 
will promote deterrence in sentencing of “affirmative action” contracts because fraud in such cases 
involves substantial non-pecuniary loss to amorphous victims.237 Therefore, to achieve maximum 
deterrence, the Commission should amend the Guidelines to vindicate non-pecuniary loss to the 
government, taxpayers and “amorphous victims” including the small business contract 
procurement market.238  In government fraud cases, many defendants plead that there is no loss to 
the government or society because the defendants performed all contractual obligations.239 To 
eliminate such defenses, defendants should be liable for the full price of a contract award because 
“[i]t is conceivable that the government paid a premium contract price above what it would pay 
for other contracts under normal competitive bidding procedures.”240 Therefore, the amended 
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Guidelines should recognize that loss to the government includes a double loss: the loss to 
taxpayers and the excess funds the government paid to a DBE or 8(a) business to realize Congress’s 
policy goals of aiding minority and women owned businesses.241   
Public policy further demands that defendants be responsible for the entire contract award 
because “[defendant’s] fraud harmed the integrity of the [8(a) and DBE] programs, which were 
designed to help legitimately disadvantaged businesses. There may also be harm . . . to legitimate 
program participants whose businesses might have received the contracts that were awarded to 
[defendant].”242  The government should be reimbursed fully for the traditional loss as well as the 
latent loss to allow the recouped funds to flow back into government coffers with the goal of aiding 
legitimate, law abiding minority applicants. Principally, reform will aid the market writ large and 
other “amorphous victims” affected by white collar contract fraud.243 As the Guidelines recognize 
that “there may be cases in which the offense level determined under [section 2B1.1] substantially 
understates the seriousness of the offense,” the Notes should be reformed to account for the 
invisible, non-pecuniary loss involved in fraud of SBA and DBE programs.244 Further examples 
of non-pecuniary loss caused by DBE program fraud include discouraging potential legitimate 
disadvantaged businesses from entering the DBE program and preventing actual recognized DBEs 
from graduating from the program.245 In sum, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for 
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 
3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that 
special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A)”246 to standardize and deter individuals that 
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defraud government “affirmative action” programs regardless as to whether a business fully 
performs a contract. 
 
The Way Forward: Preventing the Nagle Outcome Through Reasonable Reform 
 
United States v. Nagle embodies the model case study to examine how the Guidelines 
remain fundamentally flawed without reform.  Based on the current text, the Third Circuit 
reasonably interpreted the Notes in applying 3(A)(v)(II) and 3(E)(i) instead of 3(F)(ii) to 
“affirmative action” contract fraud.247  Regrettably, the Third Circuit’s decision “weakened 
prosecutor’s chances of successfully seeking [longer] prison sentences when the court allowed 
offsetting for contractual performance . . . in calculating . . . ‘loss.’”248  An examination of United 
States v. Nagle reveals three current textual issues that undermine the purpose of 3(F)(ii).  First, 
3(F) currently states “Special Rules- “Notwithstanding subdivision (A).”249  This provision 
undercuts special rule 3(F)(ii) by providing that the government benefits special rule only 
supersedes the subsection (A) general loss rule.  Second, several circuit courts mitigated loss using 
3(F)(v) (covering misrepresentation schemes) or using 3(A)(v)(II) (involving fraud of defense 
contracts).250 Because many SBA 8(a) and DBE fraud cases involve Defense Department 
contracts, the general rule in 3(A) robs 3(F)(ii) of its purpose.  Given that “affirmative action” 
contracts remain dissimilar to traditional contracts, there is no rational reason why defense 
contracts under 8(a) or the DBE should be treated differently than all other 8(a)/DBE construction 
and transportation contracts.  Third, several circuits251 reasonably concluded that mitigating rule 
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3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” note applies to reduce a criminal’s total “loss.”252  Despite the Third 
Circuit assuming that DBE contracts constituted government benefits regardless as to whether 
3(A) or 3(F) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with credit 
for fair market value of services provided under section 3(E)(i).253  As a result, section 3(E)(i) and 
the current “[n]otwithstanding Subsection A” language frustrates the goals of 3(F)(ii) even if, as 
in Nagle, the court assumes that the DBE program constitutes a “government benefit.”254  Thus, to 
resolve the textual issues in the Notes, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for 
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 
3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that 
special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”255  Amending the Notes in this manner will 
clearly indicate that the 3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” provision does not supersede the 3F special 
rules. As a result, any federal court that concludes that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs constitute 
government benefits programs will be bound to apply the 3(F)(ii) special loss rules in lieu of the 
general loss rule in sub-section (A). Requiring the application of 3(F)(ii) will ensure that a criminal 
who steals from any “affirmative action” program will be responsible for the full contract price 
awarded without mitigation for any legitimate services rendered.256  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The Commission should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section 
2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies 
“notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that special rules 
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apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”257  With differing circuit interpretations on how to apply 
the Notes, it is imperative for the Commission to amend the Notes to ensure that the government 
benefits rule applies to all SBA and DBE affirmative action programs. The lack of clarity regarding 
which rules apply to “affirmative action” contracts continues to exacerbate the discrepancies in 
sentencing, while eroding the benefits of such programs to the individuals who rightfully deserve 
financial help in their businesses. Until the Commission amends the Notes, the Supreme Court 
should hold that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs comprise government benefits to provide guidance 
and certainty in federal sentencing for white collar crimes.   
This comment scrutinizes the background of the Commission, the relevant rules at issue 
and the various circuit court cases that resolved the issue. Likewise, this comment offers a feasible 
solution to revive the principle that defrauding government benefits consistently comes with a 
steep price.  Although opponents may suggest that Congress intended to create flexible guidelines 
for federal courts, a district court imbued with too much sentencing discretion will ultimately lead 
to injustice, diluted deterrence, and disparate outcomes across the nation. In conclusion, this 
comment proposes reasonable solutions to re-calibrate federal sentencing with Congress’s original 
goals and give fair notice to offenders that they will be liable for everything they steal from the 
people. 
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